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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF u·TAH 
C-EORGE C. MAW, W. EUGENE 
l\IA\V, ORLO S. MAW and FER-
RELL J. ~IAW, R. JOHN MAW 
and JUNIOR B. MAW, VIRGIL 
G. ~IA.\V and VADEL T. MAW, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant~~ 
vs. 
\VEBER BASIN WATER CON-
SEllYANCY DISTRICT and 




NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 
9950 
This is an action brought to recover the fair market 
Yalue of shooting privileges in the Ogden Duck Club 
which were terminated as a result of the construction 
of the \Villard Bay reservoir. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the pre-trial hearing in the matter on the day 
set for jury trial the court by minute entry order (R. 
64) entered a "Judgment for non suite" in favor of 
defendants, and thereafter-even though no jury trial 
was had, as requested by plaintiffs-entered formal 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 65-69), 
and a Judgment (R. 70) dismissing plaintiffs' Com-
plaint with prejudice, thereby terminating the proceed-
ing before any evidence was submitted to a jury. 
Judge Charles C. Crowley, one of the other judges 
of the same district, had previously refused to dismiss 
the very same complaint (R. 21) when defendants in a 
prior hearing had made a formal Motion to Dismiss 
(R. 11). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment dismissing 
the action, and request that they be permitted to submit 
the facts to a jury for determination of whether a cause 
of action and damages has been established. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since plaintiffs sustained a dismissal of their com-
plaint without being afforded the opportunity of pre-
senting the facts to a jury, they are entitled under the 
well-established rules of law to have this court consider 
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the evidence which is now in the record, and which they 
might reasonably otherwise contend would be estab-
lished, in the light most favorable to themselves. The 
facts hereinafter set forth will follow the rule laid down 
by this court in the very recent case of Baur v. Pacific 
l!'illrlllcc Corporation (Utah-July 2, 1963), 383 P. 2d 
:m7, wherein this court stated-
"As we have heretofore declared, the granting 
of a motion to dismiss, which deprives the party 
of the privilege of presenting his evidence, is a 
harsh measure which courts should grant only 
when it clearly appears that taking the view 
most favorable to the complaint and any facts 
which might properly be proved thereunder, no 
right to redress could be established; and unless 
it so clearly appears, doubt should be resolved 
in favor of allowing him the opportunity to pre:-
sent his proof." 
In the year 1936 there lived in the farming com-
munity of Plain City, Weber County, a widow by the 
name of Annie C. Maw. Mrs. Maw and her four sons 
owned and operated well in excess of 1,000 acres of 
farming and grazing land in the area north of Plain 
City. being partly in Weber County and partly in Box 
Elder County. The particular grazing lands extended 
westerly into the marsh lands of the Great Salt Lake 
where individuals from the city of Ogden had organized 
a club for the purpose of shooting ducks. (See Pl. Exh. 
E). 
This group, knuwn as the Ogden Duck Club, one 
of the defendants herein, recognized that in order to 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
utilize lands which they had under lease from the State 
of Utah for such purposes, it would be well to secure 
from Mrs. Maw a written right-of-way so as to insure 
continued passage in the future across her lands in going 
to and from their clubhouse and duck hunting area. 
No other route was available. Accordingly, the Ogden 
Duck Club had its attorneys prepare a Right-of-Way 
Agreement providing for such passage rights and other 
matters. The agreement is set forth in its entirety on 
page (1) of the Appendix of this brief. Further refer-
ence will be made to it later in this brief. See also R. 5, 6. 
Being solicitous of the future of her four sons and 
her grandsons, Mrs. Maw executed the . agreement 
which, by its terms, provided that as part of the con-
sideration for the right-of-way her sons would have the 
privilege of using the duck club's "shooting grounds 
... on days excepting the opening day, Saturdays, Sun-
days, and holidays, ... ", and that the four designated 
sons could '' . . . designate one son for each thereof to 
shoot and enjoy the privileges hereunder in place of such 
son's father; . . . " 
Mrs. Maw apparently made a bargain which proved 
to be very advantageous to her entire family. Not only 
were the shooting rights and privileges enjoyed by her 
family non-assessable in that they were not required 
to pay the annual dues of the club, but it developed 
that the members of the Maw family soon were in social 
and business contact with the most elite professional and 
business leaders of the Ogden area. As an example, the 
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members of the duck club immediately prior to the 
bringing of this action included such prominent indi-
viduals as A. E. Benning, Frank M. Browning, James 
~I. De\' ine, (~eoi·ge S. Eccles, Spencer S. Eccles, W. 
L. Eccles, Ito bert N ye, J. Fletcher Scowcroft, George 
L. Abbott, Fred Froerer, Sr., Ed Greenwell, H. A. 
Benning and a long list of similar well-known indi-
vi<luals (R. 25). An equally prominent membership 
existed in prior years. These contacts considerably in-
fluenced the lives and fortunes of the four Maw sons, 
helping to provide them with credit, business and social 
contacts and an open door to many contacts which they 
would hardly have experienced as ordinary farm boys. 
Their personal contacts with the bankers, doctors, busi-
ness leaders and other members of the club, together 
with the use of boats, clubhouse facilities, blinds, and 
the experience of social activities involving parties, per-
sonal attendants, excellent food and other amenities of 
the club, all contributed to making the memberships 
exceedingly valuable. 
In the course of time three of the brothers died, 
leaving at the time when the complaint was filed one 
brother, George C. Maw, surviving. ~owever, upon 
the death of the other three brothers at least one, and in 
some instances two, of their sons were substituted in 
place of their respective fathers. These grandsons of 
Annie C'. 1\Iaw similarly used the duck club facilities 
and continued to shoot ducks and otherwise partake of 
the club's facilities in place of their fathers. 
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Althovgh the lower court took it upon itself in the 
course of pre-trial proceedings to place a construction 
of the agreement which would not permit the grandsons 
to use the facilities, nevertheless all of the affected 
parties hereto so construed the agreement as permitting 
these grandsons to continue to use the facilities which 
their fathers had previously enjoyed. 
Along about 1956, or thereabouts, in the course of 
progress, the Weber Basin District, one of the defend-
ants, acting in conjunction with the United States 
Bureau of Reclamation, concluded from its studies that 
there should be built a water storage reservoir to be 
known as the Willard Bay Reservoir. This particular 
reservoir was planned to cover a substantial portion 
of the Maw land holdings and a portion of the leased 
grounds where the duck club had its clubhouse and part 
of its shooting area. The Ogden Duck Club did not 
own any fee ground (R. 46, 48). In the meantime, 
Annie C. Maw had passed to her reward and her lands 
were passed down to Grace B. Maw, a widow of one of 
the sons, and W. John Maw and Sons, Inc., a corpo-
ration. 
The Weber Basin District contacted the Ogden 
Duck Club and arranged to physically move its club-
house about % of a mile west from its previous location 
so that it would not be inundated by the reservoir to be 
created (R. 72- p. 33), and its representatives, lawyers 
and associates contacted Grace B. Maw and W. John 
Maw and Sons, Inc., for the purpose of acquiring 
the necessary lands which the Maws owned in the reser-
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voir area (R. 7'2 - p. 47). And, as the plot for this liti-
gation began to develop, it became evident that the 
t·onstruction of the reservoir would obliterate and cover 
the road which the Ogden Duck Club had been using 
through the Maw properties. With respect to this road, 
the \V eber Basin District arranged with the Ogden 
Duck Club to furnish the latter with a road along the 
top of the reservoir dike. This new road would follow 
a different route through the Maw property from that 
which was formerly used, but ·would still traverse other 
portions of the same property which the Maws owned 
both in 1936 and up to the time of the purchase from 
then1 by the United States for the Willard. Bay Res-
ervoir (R. 72 - p. 52). 
When the Weber Basin District and the United 
States was ready to purchase the lands for the Willard 
Bay project, several members of each organization con-
tacted Mr. Orlo Maw, one of the plaintiffs, who was 
also at the time the president of W. John Maw and 
Sons, Inc., for the purchase of the properties needed 
for the project (R. 72- p. 47). Orlo Maw informed the 
various individuals that his company would not con-
sider selling the lands involved unless his uncle George, 
himself. and his cousins were protected as to their shoot-
ing privileges in the Ogden Duck Club, either in that 
they would be paid for the privileges or that the privi-
leges would not be disturbed in any way. 
Pursuant to negotiations then being undertaken, 
Orlo ~law received written assurance from the Weber 
Basin 'Yater District that by signing an out-of-court 
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agreement for the purchase of the lands, certain other 
interests, including " .. . specifically your duck club 
shooting privileges/~ would be excluded from the settle-
ment, and that such property interests which would be 
u ••• required in the construction of .the Dam or which 
would be damaged or destroyed would be appraised at 
a later date and an offer to purchase will be made.~' 
(Pl. Ex. A.) 
Thereupon on July 15, 1957, Orlo Maw executed 
a Land Purchase Contract with the United States of 
America for the purchase of the properties, wherein 
it was stated among other things that the right-of-way 
which gave the Maws claim to the duck club shooting 
privileges would not be included in the contract. Its 
terms provided as follows: 
''3a. It is understood and agreed that the rights 
to be conveyed to the United States ... shall 
be free from lien or encumbrance except: . . . 
and (ii) rights-of-way for roads, (including the 
right-of-way granted to the Ogden Duck Club 
across Tract 95) , . . . " 
(See Pl. Exh. C-LAND PURCHASE CON-
TRACT) 
.!' For nearly a year thereafter the matter rested 
quietly until members of the Maw family began to 
demand that arrangements be made to protect their 
hunting privileges or that they be paid for them. Cor-
respondence was received from J. Stuart McMaster, 
field solicitor of the United States Department of In-
terior at Salt Lake City making mention of the hunting 
10 
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privileges and suggesting a meeting to determine 
whether all of the ~law people " ... are interested in 
retaining \)ttch hunting privileges." However, nothing 
was ever concluded, and the matter dragged until court 
ad ion was finally brought. (Pl. Exh. D). 
In the n1eantime, and before court action was com-
menced, the Weber Basin District undertook construc-
tion activities, obliterated the old right-of-way which 
the Ogden Duck Club had been using, created a new 
roadway over other portions of what were the Maw 
properties which it had acquired, and the duck club 
began using the new route. The Ogden Duck Club 
thereupon notified the Maws that their duck club hunt-
ing privileges had terminated. 
It later developed in the deposition of Mr. Eubank, 
secretary of the Ogden Duck Club, that the notice given 
to the l\Iaws of the termination of their rights was given 
nfter the Ogden Duck Club had executed a Quit Claim 
Deed to the l\Iaws to various lands in the area, which 
included the right-of-way held out in the Land Pur-
chase Contract with the United States (Pl. Exh. C), 
and that the deed had been furnished "so that the Maws 
could get their settlement money" (R. 54, 59). How-
e,·er, the evidence would have actually established that 
the 'y eber Basin District was instrumental in securing 
the deed from the Ogden Duck Club, that none of the 
~law family ever knew of its existence, execution or 
delivery, and that in fact the deed was secured and 
received by the 'V eber Basin District people and re-
corded and returned to themselves (R. 72 - p. 19, 20). 
11 
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This lawsuit arose when plaintiffs were refused 
payment for the value of their duck club shooting privi-
leges. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
PERMITTED· TO PUT ON EVIDENCE TO A 
JURY· ESTABLISHING A THIRD-PARTY 
BENEFICIARY C 0 NT R ACT LIABILITY 
AGAINST THE WEBER BASIN DISTRICT. 
During the pre-trial proceedings held immediately 
prior to the scheduled trial, Orlo Maw (while sitting in 
the audience area behind the courtroom rail) stated: 
"MR. lVIA W: They informed me that by prepar-
ing this letter to protect all rights which I had no right 
to sell, that we would avoid a condemnation suit by 
proceeding with the contract, and I refused to sign the 
contract until the protection, and all of us concerned 
were given protection, and as a result the letter was 
prepared before I signed the contract. Otherwise, I 
would have let it go in the condemnation" (R. 72-p. 51). 
It is submitted that Orlo Maw, through W. John 
Maw and Sons, Inc., created a binding and valid third-
party beneficiary contract in favor of himself, his uncle 
George, and his cousins, relating to the duck club shoot-
ing privileges, and that the Weber Basin District re-
ceived the benefit of, and acknowledged the existence 
of this agreement by virtue of the following letter pre-
12 
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Pared hr leo· a l counsel for the Weber Basin District . ~ 
and delivered to l\Ir. Maw before the land purchase 
was signed by his company and Grace B. Maw. The 
letter which was delivered to him follows (Pl. Exh. A): 
\VEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT 
506 Kiesel Building 






July 5, 1957 
Assistant Engineer 




Neil R. Olmstead 
Legal Counsel 
E. J. Fjeldsted 
Manager 
Tract Nos. 95, 104, and 106 
Willard Dam and Reservoir 
W. JOHN MAW AND SONS, INC. 
It is our understanding that you have executed a 
contract for the sale to the United States of tract Nos. 
n.>. 104 and 106, Willard Dam and Reservoir. 
This letter will assure you that the land purchase 
contract does not cover your other property interests in 
the \Yillard Bay Area, and specifically your state leases, 
water rights, easements, licenses, duck club shooting 
privileges, or lands other than those described in the 
land purchase contract. Any such property interests 
13 
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which will be required in the construction of the Dam 
or which will be damaged or destroyed will be appraised 
at a later date and an offer to purchase will be made. 
Yours very truly, 
s/d E. J. FJELDSTED 
E. J. FJELDSTED 
Manager 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
ELMER CARVER, Plain City; WARD C. HOL-
BROOK, Bountiful; LEROY B. SMITH, Sunset; 
HORALD G. CLARK, Morgan; D. D. McKAY, 
Huntsville; ED\VARD SORENSON, Oakley; 
HAROLD D. ELLISON, Layton; FRANCIS V. 
SIMPSON, Hooper; W. R. WHITE, Ogden 
The foregoing letter was prepared by E. J. Skeen, 
attorney for the District, and was signed by E. J. 
Fjeldsted, Manager of the Weber Basin Water Dis-
trict. And, as has been stated, notwithstanding the 
reference in the letter that the contract had been exe-
cuted, the proof would have established that this letter 
was received ten days prior to the actual signing of the 
Land Purchase Contract, and that it would not have 
been signed had the letter not been furnished. (See Pl. 
Exh. C). 
Although the letter was addressed to W. John 
Maw and Sons, Inc., no real question can be raised that 
the corporation ever had any "duck club shooting privi-
leges", as therein contained, since it is clear that all 
concerned recognized that it had none and that the privi-
14 
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leges ran to George C. Maw and to his various nephews. 
Further, and very significantly, if the court will look 
at plaintiff's Exhibit A in the record, it will find that 
t~:xhibit A consists of three executed originals and two 
i'.l'ccntcd copies of the same letter which were handed to 
Orlo lVIa w for delivery to the various members of the 
~law family having the hunting privileges. Orlo Maw 
would have testified that he insisted that such proof 
be furnished so that all concerned would have a tangible 
record that their rights were recognized. 
Subsequently, and after more than a year, Mr. 
J. Stuart McMaster, field solicitor for the United States 
Department of the Interior, recognized that the various 
public agencies were considering these rights in the fol-
lowing letter (Pl. Exh. D) : 
UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR 
410 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
September 11, 1958 
~Ir. George C. Maw 
Roy, Utah 
Dear ~Ir. Maw: 
Thank you for your letter of September 9, 1958 
regarding the Ogden Duck Club. 
l~ ?U are advised that the matter has not been finally 
deterlllined, but we are working on it. Please advise me 
15 
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if it would be possible for us to meet at a convenient 
time with the Maw people who are interested in the 
hunting privileges. We are interested in determining 
whether or not all of them are interested in retaining 
such hunting privileges. 
I would appreciate hearing from you at your earli-
est convenience. 
Very truly yours, 
s/ d J. Stuart McMaster 
J. STUART McMASTER 
Field Solicitor 
Copy to: Reg. Dir., BR, SLCU, attn: 4-400 
Projects Manager, BR, Ogden, Utah 
The cases in Utah clearl! recognize that one person 
can make on behalf of another person a contract which 
will inure to his benefit, and that the latter can bring 
an action on the contract. This was done here. Further, 
Utah law recognizes that a direct beneficiary, whether 
he be a creditor beneficiary or a donee beneficiary, can 
bring the action. 
It is not entirely clear from Orlo Maw's statement 
as to whether he felt that W. John Maw and Sons, Inc., 
owed a duty to these plaintiffs to protect them as to their 
rights, or whether he was doing so out of other con-
siderations. In any event, whether the contract be 
founded upon a creditor or a donee relationship, Utah 
clearly recognizes this type of agreement: 
Kelly v. Richards_, 95 Utah 560, 83 P. (2d) 731, 
129 ALR 164: 
16 
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"The rule of allowing the third party bene-
ficiary to recover is recognized now in America 
beeause it is reasonable and is not merely accept-
able as a flat rule of law. It is just and expedient 
to allow the person for whose benefit the contract 
is made to enforce it against the person whose 
duty it is to pay. However, an incidental bene-
ficiary has no rights under the contract. Robins 
Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 US 303, 
48 S Ct 134, 72 L ed 290 and German Alliance 
Ins. Co. v. Homewater Supply Co., 226 US 
2:!0, 33 S Ct 32, 57 L ed 195, 42 LRA (NS) 
1000, are to the effect that before a third party 
can sue for a breach of a contract to which he 
was not a party he must show that the contract 
was intended to benefit him directly. The terms 
of the agreement and the facts and circumstances 
that surround its making can be examined to 
determine whether the supposed beneficiary was 
in fact intended to be such . " 
Further-
''A stranger may benefit by a contract if prom-
ises are made where the promisee has no pecu-
niary interest in the performance of the con-
tract, his object being to enter into it for the 
benefit of such stranger, or ~~ere the promisee 
seeks indirectly to discharge an obligation of his 
own to the stranger by securing from the promi-
sor a promise to pay such person. Vol. 12, Ameri-
can Juris prudence, Contracts, Section 283." 
The matter is further set forth in a series of cases 
from l-...tah. the rule being summarized completely in 
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"She thereafter had a right to look to him for 
payment of her claim, under the rule that "where 
a promise or contract has been made between two 
parties for the benefit of a third, an action will 
·lie thereon at the instance and in the name of the 
party to be benefited, although the promise or 
contract was made without his knowledge, and 
without any consideration moving from him." 
Montgomery v. Spencer, 15 Utah, 495, 50 Pac. 
624; Thompson v. Cheesman, 15 Utah, 43, 48 
Pac. 477; Clark v. Risk, 9 Utah, 94, 33 Pac. 
248; I Pars. Cont. p. 465." 
At this· point plaintiffs anticipate that defendants 
will attempt to attack the original 1936 Agreement 
between Annie C. Maw and the Ogden Duck Club 
on one or more theories. However, it should be pointed 
out that, even if some doubt could have existed as to 
whether or not the Maws of the second generation (i.e. 
grandsons) were entitled to the duck club shooting 
privileges, that doubt was resolved and a new contrac-
tual arrangement was entered into by the Weber Basin 
District in the form of a third-party beneficiary arrange-
ment. This is so because W. John Maw and Sons 
gave up its right to litigate the matter of compensation 
in a court of law in exchange for the recognition and 
protection of the duck shooting privileges in the Ogden 
Duck Clulh 
Nowhere in the correspondence of Mr. Fjeldsted 
or Mr. McMaster does it remotely appear that there 
was any question as to the validity of these rights; 
rather, both letters affirmatively recognize the exist-
18 
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em·e of the duck club shooting privileges. No refer-
emT was made of any privileges which "might exist," 
nor were the words "if any," or other similar lan-
•ru:wc. used. Bear in mind that both letters were written 
/"' /"' 
by lawyers. The privileges were recognized in a posi-
tive manner and the agreement to appraise and pay 
for then1 if damaged or taken was clear-cut. 
In 12 Am. J ur., Contracts, Par. 87 at p. 581, the 
general rule is stated: 
"The view is taken by some authorities that 
although forbearance from suit on a clearly in-
valid claim is insufficient consideration for a 
promise, forbearance from suit on a claim of 
doubtful validity is sufficient consideration for 
a promise if there is a sincere belief in the validity 
of the claim. The view is taken that a reasonable 
and sincere belief in the validity of the claim is 
necessary and sufficient. It is sometimes stated 
that if an intending litigant bona fide forbears 
a right to litigate, he gives up something of value. 
The reality of the claim which is given up must 
be measured, not by the state of the law as it is 
ultimately discovered to be, but by the state of 
the knowledge of the person who at the time has 
to judge and make the concession. There must, 
according to this view, be a real cause of action 
-that is, one that is bona fide and not frivilous 
or vexatious-but it is not necessary that it be 
a cause of action which commends itself to the 
ultimate reasoning of the tribunal which has to 
consider and determine the case." 
Although plaintiffs certainly do not concede that 
the Agreement executed in 1936 by Annie C. Maw 
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would not extend to and benefit her grandsons as well 
as her sons, Mr. Williston on Contracts, Vol. II, Sec" 
tion 399 at p. 1149 clearly shows that by a third"party 
beneficiary contract rights can be created in third par" 
ties greater. than might have actually existed between 
the promisee and the promisor in the first instance: 
"As summarized in the Restatement of Con" 
tracts: 'Unless the case is within the rules mak" 
ing contracts voidable for mutual mistake, where 
performance of a promise in a contract will bene" 
fit a person other than the promisee, the promi" 
sor's duty is not avoided or limited by an erro-
neous belief of the promisor or of the promisee 
as to the existence or the extent of a duty of the 
promisee to the beneficiary.' Where the promise 
is to pay a specific debt, for example to assume 
a specific mortgage, especially if the amount of 
it is deducted from the consideration paid by the 
promisor for the mortgaged property, this in-
terpretation will generally be the true one. Most 
of the cases accordingly refuse to allow one who 
has assumed a specific debt to set up usury or 
other defense, of which the debtor might have 
availed himself. It should be noticed that this 
section presents another instance where the rights 
of the beneficiary and of the promisee against 
the promisor may not be identical." 
II. THE WEBER BASIN WATER DIS-
TRICT IS EVEN NOW ILLEGALLY TRES-
pASSING ON PLAINTIFFS' LANDS AND 
RIGHTS. 
When the Motion to Dismiss was argued before 
Judge Cowley, plaintiffs contended that they were 
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s t iII entitled to their duck club shooting privileges be-
cause the original right-of-way had been retained and 
excepted from the Land Purchase Contract, as has 
been previously set forth. Unfortunately, a transcript 
of the entire argument at that time was not available . 
.J udgc Cowley denied the motion to dismiss following 
the same basic argument which is advanced in this brief. 
Later, when the deposition of Carlyle Eubank, sec-
retary of the Ogden Duck Club was taken, Mr. Eubank 
stated that the duck club had terminated the rights of 
the Maws to the shooting privileges because it had 
issued a quit claim deed (R. 51) to the Maws which 
t·overed the same lands previously deeded by the Maws. 
(Compare Pl. Exh. C-Land Purchase Contract, and 
Pl. Exh. B-Quitclaim Deed.) This included the area 
where the right-of-way was located. His statement was 
as follows (R. 54) : 
"A. No, we don't feel we have had anything 
involved in it, and we felt that by the issuance 
of this quitclaim deed to the Maws which covered 
all of that country out there, that it certainly 
abrogated anything that we would have in con-
nection with the land which we couldn't use any-
way because it had been closed off by the Gov-
ernment. We couldn't get across it. We couldn't 
get through there. We couldn't go across the 
ditch. 'V e had to go around on the Government 
road. 'Ve did feel, and do feel to this date, by 
the execution of this quitclaim deed which was 
executed by the Club which made it possible 
for the Maws to obtain their settlement from 
the United States Government on all their prop-
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erty that they had out there, that it abrogated 
anything that we had." 
Mr. Eubank again referred to the same quitclaim 
deed on questioning in his deposition ( R. 59) , thus 
arousing the suspicions of this writer and plaintiffs who 
had never before heard of such a document. Upon later 
investigation it was found that the Weber Basin Dis-
trict had gone to the Ogden Duck Club to get the quit 
claim deed involved. Suspicions were further aroused 
because Mr. Eubank stated that the Ogden Duck Club 
held no real estate in the area other than through State 
leases which were not involved in the description later 
found upon the particular quitclaim deed. Mr. Eubank 
stated in his deposition that all of the lands used by 
the Ogden Duck Club were leased grounds ( R. 46, 48), 
and that they did not own a single acre. 
It suddenly became clear that the Weber Basin 
District secured this deed in order to eliminate the 
right-of-way which was excepted in the original pur-
chase contract which was executed by Grace B. Maw 
and W. John Maw and Sons, Inc. 
A copy of the quitclaim deed was secured from 
the Weber County Recorder's office by this writer, who 
found that it did in fact cover the area over which Annie 
Maw had granted the Ogden Duck Club a right-of-
way in the 1936 Agreement. Further examination of 
the deed revealed that it did in fact run to W. John 
Maw and Sons, Inc., and Grace B. Maw, who had 
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previously given a warranty deed to the very same 
properties. 
Theorizing that this quitclaim deed from the Ogden 
Duck Club to the same persons who executed the 
original warranty deed to the lands involved would 
eliminate the right-of-way set forth in the land purchase 
contract, under the doctrine of after-acquired title, and 
thereby perfect an unencumbered title in all of the 
reservoir area in the United States, a further look was 
had at the deed. Upon examining it more closely (Pl. 
gxh. B) it revealed that it was recorded for William 
II. \Vilcox, who was at the time an employee of the 
\ V eber Basin District. 
On checking with the Maws it was found that not 
one of them or the corporation had any knowledge or 
information that such a deed had ever been executed 
or that it had been delivered to anyone, let alone a 
member of their group. Further, the original of the 
deed was nowhere to be found and it can only be as-
sumed that it is in some government office or in the 
possession of the Weber Basin Water District. At any 
rnte. the evidence would conclusively establish that none 
of the plaintiffs or any of the other Maws ever knew 
of the deed, that it was never received by them either 
before or after recording, and that it was undoubtedly 
secured by underhanded efforts of the Weber Basin 
District to perfect a land title in an attempt to avoid 
settling with the l\Ia,vs either as to the contract which 
wns made for the benefit of these plaintiffs or for the 
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actual right-of-way in which they had a vital interest. 
It is submitted by plaintiffs that the Weber Basin 
District illegally and without authorization of any kind 
secured and recorded the quitclaim deed itself because 
it full well knew that had the deed been delivered to 
the Maws it would not have been released, nor would 
another quitclaim deed have been given by them, unless 
full settlement had been made according to the existing 
understanding. 
In view of the unauthorized and unlawful action of 
the Weber Basin District in recording and retaining 
the quitclaim deed executed by the Ogden Duck Club, 
it is submitted that theDistrict is in fact a constructive 
trustee of the right-of-way property for the Maws, and 
that, since the right-of-way has been obliterated and 
the land made useless, the Weber Basin District should 
respond in damages both for the value of the shooting 
privileges which were tied to the right-of-way and also 
punitive damages. It is further submitted that the action 
of the Weber Basin District in this respect, if estab-
lished by the evidence as here claimed, is so unwarranted, 
illegal and unauthorized, that it is unnecessary to quote 
any law on the subject. 
And as for the information apparently received by 
Mr. Eubank to the effect that the quit claim deed had 
to be secured so that the Maws could get their payment 
for the lands involved (R. 54), someone apparently 
seriously misinformed Mr. Eubank because the quit 
claim deed issued by the Ogden Duck Club was dated 
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.. \ pril 7. 1958, almost a year after the land purchase 
contraet of July 15, 1957, and payment thereunder, 
and because the Ogden Duck Club had no interest in 
the subject property other than the right-of-way which 
was specifically excluded from the Land Purchase Con-
trud. It was executed at about the same time the pres-
sure was being brought by the Maws to have their rights 
recognized or to be paid for them. 
Now, so that this court can secure the full import 
of a sharp issue of fact crucial to this case, reference 
is made to pages 39 and 40 of the record. There is con-
tained an Amended Answer of the Weber Basin Dis-
trict which was filed in court on February 14, 1963-
the date set for trial and the day the Motion to Dismiss 
was granted. The interesting thing about the Amended 
Answer is that it affirmatively recognizes the existence 
of the elusive quitclaim deed ( Exh. B) which only 
came to light in Mr. Eubank's deposition three weeks 
earlier, and asserted (I) that the deed was delivered 
to 'V. John Maw and Sons, Inc., and Grace B. Maw, 
and accepted by them~· and (2) that the acceptance ter-
minated the 1936 Right-of-Way Agreement! 
It appears that someone moved too fast in setting 
up this defense, or that there were too many helpers for 
the defense, because the Amended Answer clearly rec-
ognbes that if the quitclaim deed was not delivered to 
and accepted b!J the Maws~ then the 1936 right-of-way 
agreement was not terminated! 
)lr. Eubank in his deposition admitted that the 
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quitclaim deed was brought to him by the Weber Basin 
District and Mr. Skeen, attorney for the District, 
volunteered at the time that the deed had been prepared 
by the Bureau of Reclamation (R. 55). Eubank further 
stated that there were no negotiations or discussions 
concerning the deed between the Maws and the Ogden 
Duck Club, and that the issuance of the quitclaim deed 
was the basis for the termination of the privileges of 
the Maws in the Club! (R. 59, 60). 
III. THE FACTS RAISE AN ESTOPPEL 
AGAINST THE WEBER BASIN DISTRICT. 
Without belaboring each and every issue upon 
which plaintiffs should be entitled to recover against 
the Weber Basin Water District, it is submitted that 
the facts which have been established to this point, 
albeit they are incomplete because the proof was never 
brought to actual trial, establish that the Weber Basin 
Water District should not now be permitted to employ 
side agreements or other conduct which would secure 
a land purchase settlement in one instance upon a rep-
resentation and a promise made by it, and thereafter 
renege from its first position. In the case of Weber 
Basin Conservancy District v. Hislop .. 362 P. 2d 580, 
12 Utah 2d 64, the "'\V eber Basin District was instru-
mental in negotiating an agreement with the State Road 
Commission whereby the main highway by-passed 
around the community of Huntsville because the reser-
voir created by the District inundated the former road 
serving the community. The almost complete loss of 
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trall'ic and serious resulting property and business dam-
age to the Hislop properties was permitted to go unpaid 
bt·rause this court held that no one had a compensable 
interest resulting from the flow of traffic passing one's 
business property and that, apparently, this result 
would have not been different as to the Hislops or other 
rtsidents of Huntsville even had the District made no 
provision for a re-located road, and the town left iso-
lated. Perhaps the Weber Basin Water District is 
hoping here to by-pass its commitments in the same 
way, but this is a much different case. 
The previously quoted case of Kelly v. Richards~ 
recognizes that an action can lie in estoppel on the facts 
presented here: 
" 'This estoppel arises when one of his acts, 
representation or admissions, or by his silence 
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or 
through culpable negligence induces another to 
believe certain facts to exist and such other right-
fully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will 
be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny 
the existence of such facts. It consists in holding 
for the truth a representation acted upon, when 
the person who made it, or his privies, seek to 
deny its truth, and to deprive the party who has 
acted upon it of the benefit obtained.' 21 Corpus 
Juris, pp. 1113, 1114, 1115. 
"Essential Elements-a. In General. 
'In order to constitute this kind of estoppel 
there must exist a false representation or con-
cealment of material facts; it must have been 
made with knowledge, actual or constructive, 
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of the facts; the party to whom it was made must 
have been without knowledge or the means of 
knowledge of the real facts; it must have been 
made with the intention that it should be acted 
upon; and the party to whom it was made must 
have relied on or acted upon it to his prejudice. 
To constitute an 'estoppel in pais' there must 
concur an admission, statement, or act incon-
sistent with the claim afterward asserted, action 
by the other party thereon and injury to such 
other party. There can be no estoppel if either of 
these elements are wanting. They are each of 
equal importance.' 21 Corpus Juris, pp. 1119, 
1120. See, also, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence 
(4th Ed.) p. 1644; Bigelow on Estoppel (6th 
Ed.) pp. 603, 604. 
"It is essential therefore that the representa-
tion, whether it arises by words, acts or conduct, 
must have been of a material fact; that it must 
have been willfully intended to lead the party 
setting up the estoppel to act upon it or that 
there must have been reasonable grounds and 
cause to think that because thereof he would 
change his position or do some act or take some 
course on faith in the conduct, and that such ac-
tion results to his detriment if the person sought 
to be estopped may now repudiate the words or 
interpretation placed upon such conduct. This 
does not require an actual intent to defraud but 
only that the circumstances and conduct were 
such as would perpetrate a fraud or unfair ad-
vantage if the party could now deny what he had 
induced or suffered another to believe and act 
upon. It is an essential element of estoppel in 
pais that the person involving it relied upon the 
representation or conduct of the other party, 
was influenced in his own conduct by it, and 
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would not have acted as he did but for the acts 
of which he complains ... We do not mean that 
these are all the elements, nor that in every case 
all tnust co-exist equally but some of these ele-
ments must be present in every estoppel." 
As previously stated, it is submitted that the inter-
pretation of the 1936 agreement between the Ogden 
Duck Club and Annie C. Maw would have no bearing 
upon the liability of the Weber Basin Water District. 
liowcYer, that particular issue could be of some con-
cern as to defendant Ogden Duck Club were it not for 
.Mr. Eubank's admission that the quitclaim deed ter-
minated the hunting privileges. It was upon the court's 
interpretation of this agreement that both the Ogden 
Duck Club and the Weber Basin District were sum-
marily dismissed from the lawsuit without considering 
other matters. But plaintiffs have no intention of letting 
this appeal become side-tracked into an argument relat-
ing to the extent of the 1936 Right-of-Way agreement 
as to the 'V eber Basin Water District. 
The issue of interpreting the 1936 Right-of-Way 
Agreement primarily involves a question of whether 
its benefits extended to the grandsons of Annie C. Maw, 
who represent all but one of these plaintiffs. On this 
issue, these points are set forth: 
( 1) No suggestion was raised by Mr. Fjeld-
sted in his letter (Exh. A), or in the statements 
or conduct of other persons negotiating for the 
land purchase with Orlo Maw, which indicated 
that only George C. Maw (the one surviving 
son) had such rights. Otherwise, why would five 
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executed letters have been delivered to Orlo Maw 
for further delivery among the family? 
(2) Mr. McMaster in his letter clearly ac-
knowledges the existence of the duck hunting 
privileges (Exh. D), and recognizes that the 
rights extended to several person~ 
(3) Mr. Neilson, one of the three attorneys 
for the Weber Basin District, stated (R. 73-
p. 12): 
" ... the right-of-way agreement as drawn 
is in a rather confusing manner." 
( 4) Mr. Eubank in his deposition (R. 72 -
p. 53, 54, 60) recognizes the existence of the 
rights of the Maws up to the time he gave the 
quit claim deed to the Weber Basin District and 
began using the new road. 
( 5) All of the plaintiffs would have testified, 
and Mr. Eubank admitted ( R. 72 - p. 40), that 
they used the duck shooting}acilities after their 
fathers died with full concurrence of the duck 
club. 
( 6) Any question regarding the interpreta-
tion of the 1936 Right-of-Way Agreement 
should be made against the Ogden Duck Club 
for the reason that it was prepared by its own 
attorneys and not by an attorney for Mrs. Maw 
(R. 45). 
(7) Defendant's attorneys were uncertain 
whether the 1936 Agreement was a contract or 
a covenant running with the land. (R. 72- p. 19) · 
( 8) The court variously commented on the 
1936 Agreement: "I have struggled wit~ ~t a 
bit ... " (R. 72 - p. 18); and "I say 1t IS a 
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vaeuum, it is a completed instrument, take it 
out of a vacuum and put it in life, it might not 
be, that is what I am wondering." (R. 72- p. 41). 
An analysis of the 1936 Agreement shows that it 
specifically included four sons of Annie C. Maw -
\Vilmer .T. l\Iaw, Rufus Maw, Gilbert Maw and George 
Maw. As to these sons it granted anon-assessable shoot-
in[! privileges ... n J and further stated-
a ••• provided that in any year the said Wilmer 
J. 1llaw, Rufus MawJ Gilbert Maw., and George Maw 
dcsiynate one son for each thereof to shoot and enjoy 
the privileges hereunder in place of such son"'s father.; 
Based upon the foregoing, upon the death of the 
fathers the respective sons used the privileges of the 
Ogden Duck Club without objection, on the basis that 
their parents had made a permanent designation en-
titling them to use the hunting facilities. Although 
defendants may contend that a designation could only 
be made on a year-to-year basis, and that the death of 
any son terminated any rights in their sons, the actions 
of the parties involved over the years do not bear out 
this interpretation of the agreement. 
Further, the agreement ran to the grantor " ... 
and the members of her family hereinafter mentioned 
so long as grantees and any successors shall maintain 
said clubhouse and shooting grounds for the purpose 
of shooting tcild fowl. 0 It is interesting to note that 
had the intention been to limit the contract rights to 
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Mrs. Maw and her sons it would have been an easy 
matter to say that it ran to her and her sons; rather, 
it did not refer to any designated individuals, but 
referred to the generic and all-inclusive group of "mem-
bers of her family hereinafter mentioned," and specific 
mention was made of her sons' sons, as previously set 
forth. 
Black~s Law Dictionary., 1'hird Edition~ defines 
a family as including " ... a group of blood relatives; 
all the relations who spring from a common ancestor, 
or who spring from a common root." 
Another issue which was raised at the pre-trial 
hearing both before Judge Cowley, who denied the 
motion to dismiss, and before Judge Wahlquist, was 
that the Ogden Duck Club was not obligated to any 
of the Maws, even as to George C. Maw, a surviving 
son, because the Maws no longer had an obligation to 
maintain a portion of the roadway as the 1936 Agree-
ment requires. But the proof would have been that the 
Maws were ready, able and willing to maintain the 
necessary passage of roadway involved, that they had 
done so in the past, that they were doing so as far as 
was necessary at the present time, and that they would 
do so in the future because the portion of roadway which 
they were required to maintain was never acquired by 
the Weber Basin District and still lies dormant and 
unused. 
This writer has no intention of picking the 1936 
Agreement apart piece by piece, because it is felt that 
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the eou1·t ean rend the short agreement and determine 
for itself whether any ambiguity exists in it and whether 
it en·n has any bearing on this case-which plaintiffs' 
sineerely controvert. In any event, it is submitted that 
the Ogden Duck Club has shown no excuse for relieving 
itself of an obligation to George C. Maw, one of the 
surviving sons of Annie C. Maw, nor should the Weber 
Basin \Yater Distric~ be permitted to go through the 
back door in an effort to extricate itself from liability 
in this lawsuit. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law support-
ing the Judgment in this matter were prepared in the 
netion upon the request of the court that a "memoran-
dum opinion" be prepared for the files, but since they 
represent nothing more than an attempt to relieve the 
defendants from liability upon the basis of defendants' 
own interpretation of what they would like the facts 
to establish in their behalf, and upon the back-door 
approach to the matter seeking to undermine the 1936 
Agreement, plaintiffs submit that they have missed the 
issues of this case entirely. Further, Finding of Fact 
No. H. which states that the Ogden Duck Club de-
livered the quitclaim deed involved to the Maws, is 
absolutely erroneous and unsupported, and is contra-
dicted by the record available at this time. 
IY. THE OGDEN DUCK CLUB SHOULD 
RESPOND IN DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS 
FOR BRE ... -\CH OF CONTRACT. 
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The Ogden Duck Club still uses property formerly 
owned by the Maws in going to and from its clubhouse 
facilities and shooting grounds. The clubhouse which 
it maintains is the very same clubhouse which it for-
merly had, even though it was physically removed about 
%of a mile west of where it was formerly located. And 
substantially the same shooting grounds are still used 
by it, less a portion which was taken for the Willard 
Bay Reservoir site. Although the road which it now uses 
through the property formerly owned by the Maws 
runs along the top of the dike constructed by the Weber 
Basin District for a greater part of its distance, it 
should be noted that the original agreement between the 
Ogden Duck Club and Annie C. Maw did not pinpoint 
the exact location of the right-of-way. It was in the 
nature of a floating right-of-way following the best 
available route through a large area, and the evidence 
would have established that it was altered somewhat 
from time to time to accommodate water conditions and 
other factors. 
The Ogden Duck Club, in believing the represen· 
tations of the Weber Basin District that it was necessary 
to quitclaim the roadway area to the Maws, may have 
concluded that it had thereby performed its 1936 con-
tract obligations. It obviously felt obligated up to that 
time. But the fact remains that the quitclaim deed was 
never delivered to any of the Maws or to anyone acting 
in their behalf! Under the circumstances, it is submitted 
that the Ogden Duck Club should respond in damages 
to plaintiffs, and that it might thereafter or simulta-
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rwouslv set forth a separate cause of action against the 
\\'ebe; Basin \Vater District for inducing it to take 
the action it did in reliance upon statements made to 
it that the deed was necessary in order to make it pos-
sible for the Maws to settle with the government. At 
anv r·ate, in view of these unsavory facts it is not sur-
prising that the Weber Basin Water District undertook 
to furnish legal counsel for the Ogden Duck Club 
instead of having the Ogden Duck Club secure its own 
counsel (R. 52). Perhaps, with the knowledge now 
antilablc, the Ogden Duck Club would employ separate 
counsel should the matter be returned for trial. 
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
as follows: 
" . . . Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law are unnecessary on decisions of motions 
under Rule 12 or 56, or any other ~otion except 
as provided in Rule 41 (b).'' 
In view of the foregoing rule why were Findings 
of }.,act and Conclusions of Law prepared in this 
matter? A motion to dismiss is based upon a failure 
of the complaint to state a claim entit!ing the pleader 
to relief. Quite obviously, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were prepared because the court, 
in effect, instead of permitting the matter to,go to the 
jury. treated the action as a dismissal under Rule 41 
(b), as though the plaintiffs had completed the presen-
tation of their evidence. But such evidence should have 
been entitled to go before the jury, and the court should 
not have stepped into the matter as it did. 
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The dilemma which the plaintiffs faced at pre-trial 
was that of not only setting forth their theories, as they 
had previously done in concise and definite form upon 
the court's request (R. 30-32), but in being forced to 
reveal every bit of vital and damaging evidence for 
the scrutiny of the opposition in an effort to avoid being 
thrown out of court. A pre-trial hearing which requires 
the moving party to secure from the pockets of each 
of the plaintiffs their own executed copies of letters 
furnished them by Mr. Fjeldsted so that a desperate 
effort could be made to at least preserve one's record 
for an appeal, and to come forth all other items of 
documentary evidence and push them upon the Clerk's 
desk by way of a proffer of proof at the time the court 
was ruling they could proceed no further, does not 
appear to serve the purpose of a pre-trial proceeding 
or a motion to dismiss. 
SUMMARY 
It is submitted that the facts established from what 
plaintiffs were able to get into the record, together with 
those indicated facts which plaintiffs have contended 
would be proved, show a course of conduct on the part 
of the Weber Basin Water District of such unauthor-
ized unlawful and outrageous nature that only a mini-
mum amount of legal authority should be advanced to 
support the position of the plaintiffs. It is hoped that 
this court approaches the case in its chronological se-
quence, and that it does not permit itself to fall into 
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the trap of having both defendants use the back-door 
approad1 of attaeking the 1936 Right-of-Way Agree-
mt·nt in order to extricate themselves. It is submitted 
that sueh approach, even if tried, cannot sustain their 
defensive position in any respect, but that if it were 
in faet available to the Ogden Duck Club it would only 
arail the Ogden Duck Club as to the plaintiffs other 
than George C. Maw, who still survives as a son of 
Annie C. Maw. 
The gist of this litigation is predicated upon other 
doings and dealings of the Weber Basin Water District 
whieh have been clearly outlined and set forth in this 
brief. 
Plaintiffs recognize that a trial judge is burdened 
with many cases and that the law and the problems 
whieh come before him are often very complex and con-
fusing. But, plaintiffs subJ?it that this very condition 
is the one which should cause a trial judge to avoid 
making decisions based on statements and claims of 
eounsel immediately before commencing a trial, thereby 
becoming side-tracked into a completely erroneous 
analysis of a case which he has to try. 
Judge Cowley heard lengthy arguments on the 
matter before it ever reached the pre-trial stage, and 
he took the matter under careful advisement. It was his 
ruling, exactly contrary to that of Judge Wahlquist, 
that a motion to dismiss should be denied (R. 21). 
X othing substantially different was argued before 
.T udge 'Yahlquist, at least to the point where it became 
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clear that he simply was not going to let the plaintiffs 
go to trial. Actually, Judge Wahlquist had extra ma-
terial in the form of the exhibits, the deposition of Mr. 
Eubank and plaintiffs' Statement of Legal Theories 
(R. 30). 
Plaintiffs submit that Judge Cowley was correct 
in his ruling and that Judge Wahlquist was incorrect 
in dismissing the action. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the court reverse 
the ruling of the lower court and that the matter be sent 
back for a trial before a jury to determine the matter 
of damages sustained by plaintiffs and such other issues 
as might be found to exist in this action. 
Glen E. Fuller 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
15 East 4th South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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THIS AGREEMENT made between ANNIE 
C. l\IA W of Plain City, Weber County, Utah, Grantor, 
and OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Utah corporation, and 
its me1nbers, Grantees. 
\V I T N E S S E T H 
'Yhereas, Grantor is owner of lands In Sections 
20-17-18, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
~leridian, as now appears of record in the offices of 
the County Recorders of "\V eber and Box Elder Coun-
ties, State of Utah; and 
\Vhereas, Grantees and their predecessors in 
interest are now, and have been, using said lands for 
many years for right-of-way purposes; 
Now therefore, in consideration of $1.00 in hand 
paid and other valuable consideration, receipt of which 
is hereby acknowledged and the matters herein recited, 
Grantor does hereby give and grant unto Grantees and 
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their successors in interest a convenient right-of-way 
over and across said lands for the purpose of going to 
and from the Club House owned by Grantees in Sec-
tion 12, Township 7 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, and the shooting grounds of Grantee lying 
North of the above described lands and other lands 
now owned by Grantor, and to construct and maintain 
a ditch, or ditches, at expense of Grantees, in said Sec-
tion 18, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, for the purpose of conducting water thereon, 
over, and to said Club House and grounds of said 
Grantees. This grant shall be exclusive to Grantees as 
to the purposes herein expressed except as to Grantor 
and the members of her family hereinafter mentioned 
so long as Grantees and any successors shall maintain 
said Club House and shooting grounds for the purpose 
of shooting wild fowl. 
In consideration of non-assessable shooting privi· 
leges on said shooting grounds of Grantees on days 
excepting the opening day, Saturdays, Sundays, and 
holidays, to be enjoyed by, and hereby granted to, 
the sons of Grantor named as follows, to-wit: 
Wilmer J. Maw, Rufus J. Maw, Gilbert Maw, and 
George Maw, Grantor agrees to maintain in a travel-
able condition the road which is a part of the right-of-
way herein granted to Grantees, now existing in said 
Section 20, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian along the North rod of the East half 
of said section; provided that in any year the said 
11 
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\Vilmer J. ~law, Rufus Maw, Gilbert Maw, and George 
~law may designate one son for each thereof to shoot 
and enjoy the privileges hereunder in place of such 
son's father; but it is expressly understood that blinds 
on the shooting grounds of Grantees being used at any 
time by said sons shall be given up to members of the 
Ogden Duck Club upon request. 
In consideration of the feed and grazing benefits 
to be enjoyed and hereby granted by the Ogden Duck 
Club to Grantor or her successors on lands controlled 
by said Ogden Duck Club and its successors in the 
vieinity of lands owned by Grantor, Grantor agrees to 
back up all surplus water of the two creeks running 
through lands of the Grantor above the present dam 
located on the North side of the Northeast quarter of 
said Section 20, and to turn water loose through said 
dam at the pleasure of Grantees. 
This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs 
and assigns of the Grantor and the successors and 
assigns of the Grantees. 
Annie C. Maw 
Grantor 
OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Corporation 
Grantee 
By: A. W. Hestmark 
President 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER 
On the 29th day of December, 1936, personally 
appeared before me Annie C. Maw, the signer of the 
foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me 
that she executed the same. 
(SEAL) 
Lewis J. Wallace 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Ogden, Utah 
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